The conventional wisdom for investors in private equity funds is to invest in partnerships that have performed well in the past, so-called top quartile funds. This conventional wisdom is based on the belief that performance in private equity persists across funds for the same partnership. We present new evidence on the persistence of U.S. private equity (buyout and venture capital) funds using a new research-quality dataset from Burgiss, sourced from over 200 institutional investors. Using detailed cash-flow data for funds, we study the persistence of buyout and venture capital fund performance of the same general partners across different funds. We pay particular attention to persistence pre-and post-2000. Previous research, studying largely pre-2000 data, has found strong persistence for both buyout and venture capital firms.
Introduction
The conventional wisdom for investors in private equity funds is to invest in partnerships that have performed well in the past, particularly, so-called top quartile funds.
1 This conventional wisdom is based on the belief that performance in private equity persists across funds for the same partnership. Previous research, studying largely pre-2000 data, has been consistent with this conventional wisdom. For example, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) While previous work finds persistence, there is still some question about its existence.
Kaplan and Schoar rely on Venture Economics data that Stucke (2011) shows to be flawed.
Robinson and Sensoy rely on the funds invested in by just one investor or limited partner (LP).
Chung does not have access to fund-level cash flows.
We present new and more recent evidence on the persistence of U.S. private equity (buyout and venture capital) funds using the research-quality dataset from Burgiss used in Harris, Jenkinson and Kaplan (2013) . We refer to private equity as the asset class that includes buyout funds and VC funds. We analyze the two types of funds separately. A key attribute of the Burgiss data is that they are derived entirely from institutional investors (the limited partners or LPs) for whom Burgiss' systems provide record-keeping and performance monitoring services.
This feature results in detailed, verified and cross-checked investment histories for nearly 1400 private equity funds derived from the holdings of over 200 institutional investors.
Using detailed cash-flow data for funds, we study the persistence of buyout and VC fund performance of the same investors or general partners (GPs) across different funds. We pay particular attention to persistence in post-2000 funds.
We confirm the previous findings on persistence in pre-2000 funds. There is significant persistence for buyout funds and, particularly for venture funds.
Post-2000, we find mixed evidence of persistence in buyout funds. When funds are sorted by the quartile of performance of their previous funds, performance of the current fund is statistically indistinguishable regardless of quartile. Returns for partnerships in all previous fund quartiles, including the bottom, exceed those of public markets as measured by the S&P 500. At the same time, however, regression estimates do find that current fund performance is significantly related to previous fund performance.
Post-2000, we find that performance in venture capital funds remains as statistically and economically persistent as pre-2000. Partnerships whose previous funds are below the median for their vintage year subsequently tend to be below median and have returns below those of the public markets (S&P 500). Partnerships in the top two quartiles tend to stay above the median and their returns exceed those of the public markets.
We conclude by considering the implications of these results.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we discuss the data we use. In section 3, we present and discuss our persistence results. In section 4, we conclude and summarize the implications of our results.
Data
We use vintage year performance data for U.S. buyout and venture capital funds from
Burgiss for performance as of December 2011. We include all funds for whom Burgiss can identify the GP. Our results aggregate performance for funds in a particular fund raising The underlying cash flow data of the funds are likely to be extremely accurate because LPs use Burgiss' systems for record keeping and fund investment monitoring. This "check book" data -recording the exact cash outflows made by the LPs to the GPs as well as the distributions from the GPs back to the LPs -has a number of advantages for research purposes.
The fact that the data are sourced from the back-office systems used by the LPs for reporting and fund accounting, and are cross-checked across investors in the same fund, results in levels of data integrity and completeness that could not be achieved by surveys, voluntary reporting, or (largely) involuntary reporting using Freedom of Information (FOIA) requests (the method employed by Preqin). Furthermore, when data are sourced at least in part from GPs it is possible for a GP to strategically stop reporting. The Burgiss data also are up to date -given the need for quarterly reporting by most investors -and so there are no problems resulting from a lack of updating as there can be with other commercial databases. In other words, for a given LP, there is unlikely to be any selection bias. This is an advantage over other commercial sources whose data rely on voluntary and FOIA disclosures by GPs and LPs.
The potential bias in the Burgiss data -which it shares with the other commercial sources -is how representative the LPs (and resulting GPs) are. For example, it is possible that the LPs in the Burgiss sample have had better than average experience with private equity which is why they use Burgiss and allow Burgiss to aggregate their results. The results in Harris et al. (2012) suggest that this bias is not present. Harris et al. (2013) provide a more detailed discussion of the Burgiss data and its advantages.
For each GP, we identify whether the GP has more than one type of fund. For example, some buyout fund GPs have both large cap and small cap buyout funds; and some VC fund GPs have both early stage and later stage VC funds. Because the characteristics and the partners of the different types of funds can vary, we look at persistence across the same fund type offered by the GP, not across the entire GP. For example, we look at whether the performance of a GP's early stage fund predicts the performance of the next early stage fund it raises, not the next later stage fund. In doing this, we are effectively following the sequence numbers that the GPs put on their fund.
We also eliminate annex funds and side funds. Annex funds are funds that extend an existing fund. Side funds are invested side-by-side with the main fund and have the same performance. Our results are qualitatively identical if we include these funds.
A. Buyout funds
Panel A of In this sample, Burgiss identify the fund manager / general partner (GP). For GPs who offer more than one type of fund or fund family, Burgiss also identifies the type of fund. Burgiss also tells us the fund sequence number for that GP. This allows us to determine whether the GP is fund raising for the first time or has raised funds for quite some time. All of these identifiers allow us to track the performance of the same types of funds managed by the same GP.
The last four columns present by vintage year, respectively, the number of funds that have previous performance history and the average IRRs, MOICs, and PMEs for those funds.
We have 285 funds that have information on previous fund performance. This compares to only 76 in Kaplan and Schoar (2005) . in Kaplan and Schoar (2005) . These results show that it would be very valuable to be able to predict and invest in those funds that will end up in the top two quartiles while avoiding funds that will end up in the bottom two quartiles. In the next section, we consider whether past performance helps with that prediction.
B. Venture capital funds

C. Top Quartile Funds
Persistence
In this section, we present several different analyses of persistence. The analyses focus on the PME performance measure developed by Kaplan and Schoar (2005) . The PME or public market equivalent is effectively a market-adjusted multiple of invested capital. It measures how an investment in a private equity funds compares to an investment in public equities. Sorensen and Jagannathan (2013) provide "a general justification for the use of the PME as a performance measure …" Importantly, the PME "remains a valid economic measure of performance regardless of the risk of the capital calls and distributions."
We measure public equity performance with the return on the S&P 500. A PME of 1.5
for example implies that an investor in the fund earned a total of 50% more over the life of the fund than if the investor had left its money in the S&P 500. (Our results are qualitatively similar when we use the returns on the Russell 2000, an index for smaller capitalization stocks.) The IRR and MOIC do not adjust for stock market movements and, therefore, vary meaningfully across periods of different market returns. While we focus on PME, our persistence results are generally qualitatively similar using IRR and MOIC.
A. Persistence by Quartiles -Previous Fund
In this section, we consider the conventional wisdom of investing in top quartile funds.
For each vintage year, we place each of the funds in our sample in a performance quartile based on their PME. We do this separately for buyout and VC funds. This is not possible in practice as the current PME not the final PME is known when a GP raises a subsequent fund. Our results, then, should be viewed as an upper bound as to what an investor could obtain in practice.
Brown et al. (2013) and Jenkinson et al. (2013) study the interaction of fundraising and interim performance.
Once we have performance benchmarks for each vintage year, we sort all funds into one of six groups. We place funds in groups one to four based on the past performance quartile of its most recently raised fund (as of December 2011) if such performance is available. If performance of the previous fund is not available, we place the fund into a fifth group if the fund sequence number is greater than one, i.e., it does not appear to be a first-time fund. We place the fund into a sixth group of first-time funds if its fund sequence number is equal to one. We eliminate funds that do not have a GP identification.
i. Buyout Funds
Panel A.1 of Table 3 reports the crosstabs of PME quartiles of subsequent buyout funds relative to the four PME quartiles and two other classifications of the previous fund. The panel also reports the average IRR, MOIC and PME for the six different classifications.
The panel shows that there is modest persistence in buyout fund performance. Funds with a previous fund in the top quartile are in the top quartile 27.5% and above median 55% of the time. Funds with a previous fund in the bottom quartile are in the top quartile less than 20%
and above median less than 40% of the time. The differences between the top and bottom quartile are not significant at the 10% level (chi-squared test).
Funds previously in the top quartile have an average PME of 1.34 while funds in the bottom quartile have an average PME of only 1.10. The difference in means is significant at the 1% level. Funds in the second and third quartile have average PMEs lower than those in the top quartile and higher than those in the bottom quartile, but the differences are not significant. (2005) and Chung et al. (forthcoming) that the ability to raise a subsequent fund is significantly related to past performance.
ii. Venture Capital Funds
Panel B.1 of Table 3 reports the crosstabs of PME quartiles of subsequent VC funds relative to the four PME quartiles and two other classifications of the previous fund. The panel also reports the average IRR, MOIC and PME for the six different classifications.
The panel shows that there is marked persistence in VC fund performance. Funds with a previous fund in the top quartile are in the top quartile and above median , respectively, more than 48% and 65% of the time. Funds with a previous fund in the bottom quartile are in the top quartile less than 15% and above median less than one-third of the time. The differences between the top and bottom quartile are significant at the 1% level (chi-squared test).
Funds previously in the top quartile have an average PME of 2.26 while funds in the bottom quartile have an average PME of only 0.79 The difference in means is significant.
Funds in the second and third quartile have significantly lower average PMEs than those in the top quartile, but significantly higher than those in the bottom quartile.
Funds that appear to be first-time funds have average performance roughly equal to the average performance of funds in the second quartile. Funds that do not have previous performance, but may not be first-time funds have average PMEs that are between those of third and fourth quartile funds.
It is worth noting that funds in the top three quartiles have average PMEs that exceed one, i.e., average performance exceeds that of the S&P 500. This is at odds with the conventional wisdom that only top quartile funds beat the S&P 500. (forthcoming).
iii. Sensitivity
As mentioned earlier, the results are qualitatively similar if we sort by previous fund IRR or previous fund MOIC quartiles for both buyout and VC funds. We also sorted previous funds on PME ranges. We considered top quartiles funds to have PMEs above 1.50; second quartile funds, PMEs between 1.25 and 1.50; third quartile funds beteween 1.0 and 1.25; and bottom quartile funds, PMEs below 1.0. Table 4 reports the results of these sorts. For both buyout and VC funds, we obtained qualitatively similar results to those found using quartile sorts.
B. Persistence by Quartiles -Second Previous Fund
It is possible that the current and previous funds of a private equity GP include investments in the same company. If some of these investments are particularly successful or unsuccessful, they might induce persistence across current and previous funds. Investments are less likely to coincide in the current fund and the second previous fund. Accordingly , table 5 repeats the analyses in table 3 using the second previous fund. In sum, there is strong evidence of persistent persistence across the entire sample and in both sub-periods from the second previous fund to current fund performance.
C. Persistence Regressions: PMEs versus previous fund PMEs
In this section, we estimate regressions to explain current fund PMEs using previous fund PMEs as well as measures of fund size. We use the log of PME to reflect the fact that the distribution of PME is right skewed. The regressions include vintage year dummy variables for both the current and previous funds.
i. Buyout Funds
Panel A of table 6 reports regressions for the 285 funds in the buyout sample with previous fund performance. Previous fund PME is significantly related to current fund PME.
The coefficient in column 1 implies that a 10% increase in the previous fund PME is associated with a 2.7% increase in the current fund PME.
There is a positive, but insignificant relationship between the second previous fund PME and the current fund PME.
The fourth and fifth columns of panel A of table 6 include measures of fund size. Some
LPs believe that increases in fund size lead to poor subsequent performance. Other LPs believe that larger funds do not perform as well as smaller funds. Column four includes the (log) change in fund size from the previous fund. Column five includes the (log) of current fund size. Neither size variable is statistically significant.
Panel B repeats the regression analyses only with pre-2001 vintage year funds. The previous fund PME is again significantly related to current fund performance with a coefficient of 0.293, implying that a 10% increase in the previous fund PME is associated with a 2.9% increase in the current fund PME. Again, change in fund size and fund size are unrelated to performance.
Panel C repeats the regression analyses only with post-2000 vintage year funds. The previous fund PME is related to current fund performance with a similar and statistically significant coefficient of 0.280. This implies that a 10% increase in the previous fund PME is associated with a 2.8% increase in the current fund PME. Again, change in fund size and fund size are unrelated to performance.
By these regression measures, there is persistence in buyout fund PMEs in the sample overall as well as in both sub-periods. The magnitudes are similar in both sub-periods. These results are statistically stronger than the non-parametric results in the quartile analysis in tables 3 and 4.
ii. Venture Capital Funds
Panel A of table 6 also reports regressions for the 436 funds in the VC sample with previous fund performance. Previous fund PME is significantly related to current fund PME.
The coefficient in the first VC regression implies that a 10% increase in the previous fund PME is associated with a 3.4% increase in the current fund PME. This is greater that the coefficient for buyout funds, albeit not significantly so.
There is also a significant, but economically small relationship between the second previous fund PME and the current fund PME. A 10% increase in the second previous fund PME is associated with a 1.7% increase in the current fund PME.
The fourth and fifth VC regressions of panel A of table 6 include measures of fund size.
While the coefficient on the (log) change in fund size from the previous fund is not significant, the coefficient on the (log) of current fund size is positive and statistically significant. This indicates that larger funds are associated with higher PMEs. This result is not consistent with larger funds leading to lower returns in the cross-section.
Panel B repeats the regression analyses only with pre-2001 vintage year funds. The previous fund PME is again significantly related to current fund performance with a coefficient of 0.365. This implies that a 10% increase in the previous fund PME is associated with a 3.65% increase in the current fund PME. Again, the log of fund size is positively related to performance.
Panel C repeats the regression analyses only with post-2000 vintage year funds. The previous fund PME is related to current fund performance with a smaller, but still statistically significant coefficient of 0.281. This implies that a 10% increase in the previous fund PME is associated with a 2.8% increase in the current fund PME. Again, the change in fund size is not related to performance. The log of fund size is positively, but only marginally significantly related to performance.
By these regression measures, there is persistence in VC fund performance in the sample overall as well as both sub-periods.
D. Persistence Regressions: PMEs versus previous fund quartiles
In this section, we estimate regressions to explain current fund PMEs using the previous fund PME quartile. We also include dummy variables for funds that are first-time funds as well as funds that are not first-time funds, but do not have previous fund performance information. The excluded variable is previous fund in the top quartile. Again, we use the log of PME as the dependent variable. The regressions include vintage year dummy variables for the current fund. The coefficients on the dummy variables measure the percentage change in PME from the PME of a fund that was previously in the top quartile.
i. Buyout Funds
The first regression in panel A of 
E. Persistence Regressions: PMEs versus previous fund PMEs with GP fixed effects
In this section, we estimate the regressions of PMEs versus previous fund PMEs using GP fixed effects. This estimate measures the variation of PMEs within particular GPs.
i. Buyout Funds
Panel A of Table 8 ii.
Venture Capital Funds
Panel B of Table 8 reports the regression results for VC funds. Current fund PMEs are negatively related to previous fund PMEs in both sub-periods. As with the buyout funds results, the negative coefficients suggest that there is some regression to the mean for individual GPs. In other words, GPs who perform particularly well in one fund, perform less well in the next fund.
Combined with the opposite results in the earlier regressions that do not include fixed effects, these results indicate that funds that were previously high (low) performers perform better (worse) than the average fund in subsequent funds, but do not attain the same level of superior (inferior) performance as they did previously.
Surprisingly, the regressions also indicate that increased fund size by a particular GP is not associated with a decline in performance..
Summary and Implications
In this paper, we have used detailed cash-flow data to study the persistence of buyout and VC fund performance of the same investors or general partners (GPs) across different funds.
It also is worth adding that our results overstate the amount of persistence because they assume that previous fund performance is known at the time the next fund is raised. In fact, previous fund performance at the time of fundraising is a noisy measure of the eventual fund performance.
These results have interesting implications for buyout fund investors. First, the decline in buyout fund persistence combined with a continuation of above public market returns is consistent with at least two explanations. It is possible that the buyout business has changed, with operating engineering becoming increasingly important. (See Kaplan and Stromberg (2009)). Some general partners adjusted while others did not. Alternatively, it is possible that general partners learned from each other and that has led to the reduction in persistence.
Second, the decline in persistence casts doubt on the industry rule of thumb to invest only in funds that were previously in the top quartile. Except, perhaps, for the bottom quartile, previous quartile performance is not a strong predictor of current fund quartile performance.
Third, the lack of a performance-size relation suggests that buyout funds have been able to scale their performance as they have become larger. PMEs in the post-2000 period are not appreciably different from those in the earlier period despite much larger fund sizes.
For VC funds, post-2000, we find that performance more or less remains as statistically and economically persistent as pre-2000. Partnerships whose previous funds are below the median for their vintage year subsequently tend to be below median and have returns below those of the public markets (S&P 500). Partnerships in the top two quartiles tend to stay above the median and their returns exceed those of the public markets. We also fail to find a negative relation between performance and fund size. These results imply much greater stability in the venture capital industry over time. The same forces that operated in the 1980s and 1990s appear to still be in effect.
Our results on VC funds have two implications. First, the persistence of persistence suggests that the industry rule of thumb to invest in funds that have previously performed well and to avoid funds that have not remains consistent with our results. At the same time however, funds with previous performance in both the top and second quartiles outperform the S&P 500.
This is not consistent with the view that only very few funds outperform. In fact, previous funds that are above median appear to do so. 
